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Abstract 
This paper  introduces price discrimination, especially second-degree price discrimination, and 
applies its theory in the context of modern payment terminal markets, where two service packages, 
one of iZettle’s and the other of OP Kassa, are analyzed. Theory part deals with price 
discrimination through quantity-discount packages and two-part tariff, where as in the analysis 
part we applie the two-part tariff model. In both parts, in theory and analysis part, we found that 
second-degree price discrimination is a profitable tool for pricing. 
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Pricing is never ending subject and function, starting from simple and narrow point of view 
continuing with constant addition of variables, theories and angles from various disciplines. 
Pricing is also one of the core themes of economics. It has an great impact on firms profits 
through its affects on the levels of demand and the unit profits of sold products and services. 
In this text, concentration will be on some what limited point of view of pricing. This is about 
price discrimination, mainly about the second degree price discrimination, and its analysis in 
the context of the modern payment terminal services. Opening the definition of the modern 
payment terminal services’ happens in the beginning of the analysis part. 
1.1 Definition of the Price Discrimination 
	  
Fundamental definition of the price discrimination is that the same product is sold for 
different consumers at different prices. (H.R Varian 1989)  Stigler (1987) goes further with 
the description of price discrimination: “price discrimination is present when two or more 
similar goods are sold at prices that are in different ratios to marginal costs.” Stigler explains 
this through simple book sales example, where paperback book is sold for $5 and hard cover 
for $15. On his point of view those can be seen as the same product, because the type of the 
book cover doesn’t explain the price difference, so there must be price discriminaton. This 
latter point of view takes in account more relativity as the former and also describes the 
roguish nature of pricing and price discrimination. 
1.2 Review of the First- , Second- and Third-Degree Price Discrimination 
	  
Price discrimination is commonly divided into three more or less different price 
discrimination theories. These theories are 1st , 2nd  and 3rd degree price discrimination.  
First-degree price discrimination is commonly thought as a very theoretical model, called also 
perfect price discrimination, because it is about setting the maximum price for the product, 
that one is willing to pay. (H.R Varian 1989) Imagine that in the supermaket the cashier 
magically knows every customers’ maximum willingness to pay for a lollipop and due to that 
knowledge, she prices differently the lollipop for each customer. Broader review of first 
degree price discrimination is left out of this paper. 
The second-degree price discrimination, known also as menu-pricing, is about creating a 
menu or offering of different packages with different price. When the menu or package 
offering is set, then the customer by itself selects the option that benefits her the most. One 
way of executing packaging is amount discounts, which means for example that a 
supermarket who sells pasta, would set three packages of pasta that includes different amount 
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of macaron and sets the price for these packages. Then in the supermarket, customer chooses 
from these three options, the one that suits her best. This price discrimination theory is core of 
this work. 
The third-degree price discrimination reminds about the first-degree price discrimination. 
Where the optimal price setting for each person is conducted separately, whereas in the third 
degree price discrimination the optimal price is set for a specific group chosen by certain 
criterias. Very classic example of this is student discounts. This part of price discrimination 






2.1 Stucture and goals 
	  
This thesis is based on two main parts. The first is theory explanation and the second is 
analysis part. The theory part of the price discrimination is a literature review and its first goal 
is to describe and understand the basics of the second degree price discrimination. And the 
second goal is to show its opportunity to optimize pricing for increase in profits. Where as the 
goal of the analysis part is to describe the pricing in the modern payment terminal markets 
through the application of second degree price discrimination theory. 
2.2 Models 
	  
The core of the theory part is mathematical computation, two second degree pricing models 
and a graphical view of these models. Concentration of presenting these mathematical models 
will be some what shorted from the sources. 
2.3 Analysis of the Modern Payment Terminal Services 
	  
In the analysisis part, two modern payment terminal service providers are chosen and the 
prices of these services are found from their websites and only certain service packages are 
chosen for simplicity of comparison.  
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3. Second-Degree Price Discrimination Theory 
	  
This part starts with defining a few conditions generally for price discrimination, then 
concentration is on understanding further the second degree price discrimination from 
introduction part and finally two theories of second degree price discrimination is dealt 
through mathematical computation and graphical view. Presentation of quantity discounts are 
chosen, because it describes well the nature of second degree price discrimination and this 
review creates a great base for viewing the two-part tariff pricing strategy, that is relevant for 
the analyisis part due to the current pricing decissions made by these modern payment 
terminal service firms. These firms has currently chosen the two-part tariff strategy for the 
packages chosen to the comparison. 
3.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination 
	  
Varian argues in the Handbook of Industrial Organization that “Three conditions are 
necessary in order for price discrimination to be a viable solution to a firm’s pricing 
problem.” He writes that the firm must have some market power, ability to sort customers and 
also ability prevent sales.  
Basic economics knowledge of competitive markets is that, if someone is trying to sell a 
product with higher price than the others, this firms product won’t be bought. So in order to 
be able to use price discrimination, the firm must have some market power to be able to price 
above the marginal cost. Furthermore, to know how to set right prices for different customers, 
the firm must be able to sort them. Varian uses examples of age and time for sorting. Carlton 
and Perloff (1994) have several examples of preventing the resale, which is Varian’s third 
condition. They discuss that some goods are not that easy to resell, because of their nature of 
the product. Services and electrical power are example of these kind of products. Also side 
costs such as taxes and transportation costs can be used as a factor that can prevent the 
resales. For example when the firm is selling products to different regions or countries. 
3.2 Two Types of Consumer 
	  
Varian and also Gotlibovski and Kahana uses two types of consumers example to compute 
mathematical model of second-degree price discrimination. Their approach to mathematical 
presentation is a bit differently computed from each other and in this paper the Gotlibovski 
and Kahana’s presentation is used. The continuum of types example is presented in Varian’s 
text, but dealing with this will be left out of this paper. 
Consider a situation where there is a profit-maximizing monopolist producing single product 




type 1 by 𝑆?, but it will also decrease the package 1 interest for the high demand type by the 
area of 𝑆??. This also meaning that now the monopolist can increase the price charged for 𝑞?? 
by 𝑆?? and as long as 𝑆?? is more than 𝑆?, the monopolist’s profit is increased. Next step is to 
reduce the amount targeted at type 1 so that it just equals the amount gained from type 2. 
As mentioned, when setting the price for type 2, it has to be taken in account that this type 
could fake and try to be type 1 so taking it in account, type 2 faking is given by 𝐺𝑆? 𝑞? −
𝐺𝑆? 𝑞? . 
Type 2 can be charged by the monopolist for the package of size 𝑞??  by type 2’s willingness 
to pay minus his surplus from faking to be type 1 consumer: 𝐺𝑆? 𝑞?? − (𝐺𝑆? 𝑞? − 𝐺𝑆? 𝑞? ) 
Where as the monopolist’s profit as a function of 𝑞? is: 
𝜋(𝑞?) = 𝐺𝑆? 𝑞? + 𝐺𝑆? 𝑞?? − 𝐺𝑆? 𝑞? − 𝐺𝑆? 𝑞? − 𝑐(𝑞? + 𝑞??) 
And the first-order condition for maximation of 𝜋 is 
??
???
= 0   
Later in the analysis phase of modern payment terminal services, we find that there are also 
quality differences included in pricing. Maskin and Riley (1984) where first to prove that this 
quantity based discrimination model is also applicable for price discrimination by quality. 
Further explanation of proving and representing this applicability is left outside of this work.   
3.2.2 Two-Part Tariffs 
	  
“A two-part tariff is one in which the consumer pays a lump-sum fee for the right to buy a 
product, in addition to an ongoing fee for its actual use” Gotlibovski and Kahana (2010). A 
few examples of the two-part tariffs that Gotlibovski & Kahana uses are taxi payment, where 
taxis have a starting fee and per-kilometer charge, and telephone services, which has monthly 
charge and air-time based cost. 
They highlight, that for the two-part tariffs, there must be prevention of resale so that the 
payer of the lump-sum fee can’t purchase large amounts of the product and resale to other 
consumers. 
Now continuing the Gotlibovski’s & Kahana’s described price discrimination model creation 
from caption 3.2, where we saw that if the monopolist knows the consumer types, it can 
choose optimal marginal cost plus lump-sum fee for the different types. As in the example of 
quantity discounts, also in two-part tariffs type 2 consumer can pretend to be type 1. Given 
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that, the pricing model where the monopolist has perfect price discrimination based pricing, 
isn’t anymore optimal for the monopolist. 
However, it is still optimal for the monopolist to set the consumer type 2 marginal price to c, 
but the lump-sum fee can’t no longer be the whole net consumer surplus. The basic idea of 
setting the lump-sum fee for type 2 is, that the two-part tariff meant for type 1 becomes less 
and less attractive to him and then the slump-sum fee can be increased for type 2.  
The monopolist is able to reduce type 2’s attractiveness from the targeted two-part tariff for 
type 1 by increasing the marginal price for type 1 from c to 𝑝?? in figure 2b and also 
decreasing the type 2’s lump-sum fee exactly to its new net surplus (see the triangle 𝑝??𝐸?𝜃? in 
figure 2b). This pricing action decreases type 2’s outcome from faking to be type 1 by 
trapezoid 𝑆?? in figure 2b. Furthermore, the slump-sum fee for type 2 has to be lower by 𝑆?? 
than type 2’s net surplus at price c. While the decrease of type 1 two-part tariff marginal price 
decreased the monopolist profits, at the same time it increased the profit from the type 2 by 𝑆?? 
and as long as 𝑆??is greater than 𝑆?, the profit for monopolist increases. The type’s 1 marginal 
price is decreased as long as the type 2 increase of the profit is equal to the loss of decrease of 
the type 1 price. 
Now the computation of optimal two-part tariff can be computed: 𝑝?is the marginal and 
netsurplus 𝑁𝑆?(𝑝?) is the function of lump-sum fee for the consumer 1. So the surplus for 
consumer 2 from faking to be consumer 1 is 𝑁𝑆?(𝑝?) − 𝑁𝑆?(𝑝?) = 𝑆??(𝑝?). Given this, 
consumer 2 can be charged by marginal price c = 𝑁𝑆?(𝑐) − 𝑆??(𝑝?) in addition to the targeted 
lump-sum fee. 
This would mean that the price would be constructed from the are of marginal cost and slump-
sum fee, that is for consumer 1 the are of 𝑝??𝐸?𝑞??0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑝??𝐸?𝜃?  and for the consumer 2 the 
are of 𝑝?𝐸?𝑞??0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸?𝐸?𝐸?𝐸?. 
Next step is to set the profit function 𝜋 𝑝1  and the first-order for maximation of 𝜋 is 𝜋 𝑝?∗ . 
Further creation of these phases can be seen in Gotlibovski & Kahana (2009). 
3.2.3 Profit Comparison 
	  
According to Gotlibovski & Kahana, if monopolist can’t reckognize which consumer is 
which, the price quantity comes always first in profits compared to two-part trafits. In their 
writing, one example shows that quantity discounts’ beats two-part tariffs in profits by 6% an 
in another example nearly by 3%. In addition, while calculating and comparing these price 
models, there has to be taken in account, that it might be profitable to serve only the higher 
demand type consumer.  
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The narrow presentation of the profit differences between the quantity discount and two-part 
tariff model was left outside of this paper, because the goal and concentration in this text was 
chosen for understanding these models for simple analysis purposes in the Modern Terminal 
Services part. Further understanding of the reasons of higher profits of quantity discount is 
recommended for broader analysis of optimal prices of these services. Especially when using 















4. Pricing Analysis of the Modern Payment Terminal Services 
	  
In this analysis part we start from describing these services and then defining a few 
conditions, which then offers the scope in what we are conducting the analysis. In this text, 
payment terminal services mean that there is a device, that can be used for card payments, 
payment terminal, this service also includes a display. This service has also an operating 
system. In addition to this definition of classical payment terminals, by modern terminal 
services we concentrate on the services, that include payment terminals, which has wireless 
usage capabilities and has high mobility features. Also the display and its usage is working 
remotely and in our later examples all those payment terminals, and these operating systems, 
runs on tablets. Also prices, onboarding process for accepting card payments and delivery 
time of devices are designed to quick access of accepting card payments. Also ease without 
complicated contracts and time taking introduction need to payment terminals and operating 
systems, as these merchants are more or less familiar with usage of tablets.  
4.1 Conditions for the Analysis of the Modern Payment Terminal Services 
	  
First condition for the analysis is that we are restricting the quality variation of different 
service providers’ packages, by analysing only service packages that includes payment 
terminal and the software for its usage by tablets, but these tablets won’t be included in the 
package nor cash registers or receipt printers. There are also quality variables such as delivery 
time of the service, opening hours of the customer service and also service agreement levels, 
which are left out of the comparison. Also possible differences in software for controlling the 
payment terminal on tablets, will be let outside of the analysis. Many of these service 
providers also provides extra services, for example financing, or has integration capabilities 
such as e-commers cooperation and automatisated book keeping. These extra features won’t 
be also included in the price comparison. The analysis are also restricted to two actors in the 
field, because that provides best application of the above mentioned two customer type 
pricing examples. These service providers are iZettle and OP Kassa. PayPal’s recent 
acquisition of iZettle for 2.2 billion USD, describes shortly the market of these kind of 
services. 
4.2 Description of iZettle’s and OP Kassa’s current pricing 
	  
Given these restrictions for analysis of these modern payment terminal services’ pricing in the 
perspective of price discrimination, we can now start describing the nature of the pricing 




Service	  provider	   Slump-­‐sum	  fee	   Transaction	  cost	  
iZettle	  Go	   €19,00	   1,95%	  
OP	  Kassa	  Startti	   €79,00	   2,50%	  
Table 1 
As seen on the table, OP Kassa Startti is more expensive with all the positive card payment 
volumes merchants receives. To be able to compare these two packages, we define by random 
the yearly amount of card payments for these two types that has different level of card 
payments per year. The type 1, which is the lower type, has worth of 5000 € card payments 
per year and the type 2, the higher type, has worth of 50 000€ per year. By assuming this we 
only know the amount of Q for demand Q(P) function, but we don’t know the demand 
function and we are looking the Q only at one point. 
 Defining the demand function, or quessing it, will be left for suggestions to future research. 
To form the two type second-degree price discrimination two-part tariff model for comparison 
of these three packages, we also need marginal cost c for comparison.  
Merchants’ marginal cost in reality is constructred from transaction fees and device costs such 
as payment terminal and tablet, but at this comparison we take it as constant. Even though 
transaction cost is volume based. There also may be big differences in that cost for service 
providers, for example if the service provider is producing part or most parts of the 
transaction card payment activities by itself. For that reason it wouldn’t have to pay so much 
margins to another party or parties. Also such factors as retention rate and acquisition cost 
will be left outside of this analysis. 
In the package comparison, we put these two packages on the line and see how they do with 
these two consumer types. We think these packages as they would be packages of one service 
provider, so that we can have a look on them as a one menu-price setting. Given the prices in 
the table 1 and assumptions created above, we get the profits for each package and we see in 
the table 2 that with these two packages, iZettle will be chosen by both of customer types. 
This means that the OP Kassa package price has been designed badly, because it won’t be 
chosen for the more expensive price. 
 
Transaction	  volume	  of	  type	  i	  (€)	   Cost	  of	  iZettle	   Cost	  	  of	  OP	  Kassa	  
Type	  1	  -­‐	  5000	   €116,50	   €204,00	  
Type	  2	  -­‐	  50000	   €994,00	   €1	  329,00	  
Table 2 
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4.3 Application of the Two Customer Type Model  
	  
Now we think about these packages as they would be packages of one service provider, 
because that allows us to understand how menu-pricing works with these two packages. And 
before we are thinking about changes in current pricing, we’ve to deal with one critical 
missing factor, the demand curve, which restricts the maximum price the merchant is willing 
to pay for each transaction volume. Despite the knowledge of the missing demand curve, 
we’ll continue with the limited knowledge and again leaving demand curve review part for 
the further research, because it won’t be limitation for the review of changing these prices a 
little, especially in the purpose of pointing the optimal menu-price creation. Also we are 
supposing these prices won’t be already above the demand curve, because these products 
knowingly sells in the markets. 
We start thinking about the price change from the table 2 and from the wanted outcome 
change, what would be that the both types wouldn’t by the same package, so that the “one 
service provider” would make more profit by the price changes. We would like to change at 
the same time iZettle’s and OP Kassa’s price so that the type 2 cost change for example for 
iZettle would increase above OP Kassa’s price while this OP Kassa package price is some 
what lowered at the same time and also keep iZettle’s type 1’s price still lower than type 1’s 
OP Kassa price. For example if we change iZettle’s lumps-um fee from 19 euros to 49 euros 
and remaining the transaction as it was and then lowering OP Kassa’s transaction fee from 
2,5% to 1,80% (Price changes in the table 3), we see in the table 4 that type 1 would still 
prefer iZettle, but type 2 would now rather choose OP Kassa before iZettle. 
 
Service	  provider	   Slump-­‐sum	  fee	   Transaction	  cost	  
iZettle	   €49,00	   1,95%	  
OP	  Kassa	   €99,00	   1,80%	  
Table 3 
 
Transaction	  volume	  of	  type	  i	  (€)	   iZettle	   OP	  Kassa	  
Type	  1	  -­‐	  5000	   €146,50	   €189,00	  





In the original version (Table 2) type 1 + type 2 profit, 116,50€ + 994€, was 1 110,5€ and now 
with the new pricing (Table 4) 146,50€ + 999,00€ = 1 170,50€, which is exactly 60 euros 
more than the profit in the first version of the pricing. In percents, the change increased 5,4% 
the original price. 
 
Now if we look at back at the table 1 and think about these packages again separately for two 
different service providers, we noticed that for the both types, iZettle’s package was more 
preferable to OP Kassa’s pricing. If OP Kassa would like to make the pricing more favorable, 
it would have to lower its prices, but then the question is, is it worth it to try to chase both of 
the types or just the other. That could debend on the amount of types 1 and 2 in the market, if 
lowering the price so that the type 2 price times amount of the 2 type merchants would make 
merchants choose OP Kassa’s package over iZettle’s and at the same time lower profit more 
than the gain of the type 1 price times amount of type 1 merchants, OP Kassa should serve 
only type 2 merchants. Analysis of further actions of price setting of the service providers, 
could offer interesting outcomes. 
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5. Conclusions and Future Research Suggestions 
5.1 Conclusions 
	  
We started understanding generally the concept of price discrimination and the menu pricing, 
which was our first goal. We also achieved the second goal, which was to present the gain in 
profits through menu-pricing actions. It was pointed in both parts, in the theory and analysis 
part, that the second-degree price discrimination can be a profitable tool. The third goal was to 
describe the nature of the iZettle's and OP Kassa’s pricing for the packages chosen for 
analysis and also to apply second-degree model in practice.  In the application phase, we 
found that a little restructure of prices of the service packages lead to our profit change of 60 
euros, which was 5,4% increase to original price. 
5.2 Future Research Suggestions 
We faced the lack of demand curve estimation in the analysis part and concentrating on 
creating the demand curves for these two different types, would be my future research 
suggestions to achieve more comprehensive and usable analysis of the affects for profits from 
different changes in menu-pricing. I also suggest to include quantity package proposals while 
taking in account quality differences between products, because analysis in this text where 
very limited and taking quality differences more widely in account, would offer more realistic 
outcomes. Furthermore, using models of game theory, could offer useful tools for analysis of 
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